The contract
Bailey signs a year's contract with the Riverside Company and receives $15.S1 ↗
A $15 advance and a fraud presumption: Alabama's labor-contract law struck as peonage.
Alonzo Bailey took a $15 advance on a year's farm contract, worked about five weeks and left. Under Alabama's §4730 leaving was evidence of fraud, and he was barred from testifying about his intent. He was fined $30 and, in default, held to hard labor for 136 days. The Court struck the statute as in conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment and the federal peonage law.
The Court said it dismissed from consideration that Bailey was Black.S1 ↗Alonzo Bailey signed a year's farm contract with the Riverside Company in December 1907 and took a $15 advance. He worked through January and a few days into February and left. Under Alabama's §4730, quitting after an advance without repaying was evidence of intent to defraud, and a separate rule barred him from testifying about his uncommunicated motives, so the one person who could rebut the presumption could not speak to it. He was fined $30 and costs, and in default held to hard labor: 136 days.
The arithmetic was the point: a worker could be jailed and forced to labor for walking away from a debt he could not pay down. The Supreme Court, 7–2, struck the statute as in conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment and the federal law enforcing it. What the State may not do directly, Justice Hughes wrote, it may not do indirectly.S1 ↗
The Court decided on colorblind grounds of contract and debt and said so: it dismissed from consideration the fact that Bailey was Black, in a case about a system that re-bound Black labor after slavery. Justice Holmes, with Justice Lurton, dissented, reading the statute as an ordinary fraud law.
Bailey won his case. Whether the system he stood against lost its war is the divergence this file measures.S1 ↗
Presumptions cannot achieve forbidden compulsion.
State of Alabama and the power it used. The people on the citizen side are named as the case names them and are not scored.
A 7–2 ruling that struck the fraud-presumption trap and set the rule against doing indirectly what cannot be done directly.
Clyatt defined peonage; Bailey struck the fraud trap; Reynolds struck the surety trap.
All-time consequence · high. Pointed toward the citizen.
Power level from the earlier version of this page. Band 63–69 · ±3 uncertainty.
citizen-protective · settledWon, 7–2
The statute is void. A presumption cannot achieve what a direct command could not. The Court decided on colorblind grounds.S1 ↗
Holmes read it as a fraud law.S1 ↗
Bailey signs a year's contract with the Riverside Company and receives $15.S1 ↗
After January and a few days of February he stops working, without repaying.S1 ↗
Under §4730, leaving is evidence of fraud and he may not testify to his intent; $30 fine, 136 days at hard labor in default.S1 ↗
Hughes for the Court; Holmes dissents with Lurton.S1 ↗
The opinions and records behind every line on this page.
Hughes, J., for the Court; Holmes, J., dissenting with Lurton. Decided 3 January 1911. The contract, the $15 advance, §4730, the evidence rule, the $30 fine and 136 days.
Three years later, the surety trap struck.
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Each entry opens the court's own words, a plain reading and the limit of the rule.
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A state may not compel labor for debt through a criminal presumption that leaving a job is fraud.
…is in conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment, and the legislation authorized by that Amendment, and is therefore invalid.S1 · Justia · U.S. Reports ↗
The definition of peonage.
S1 · Justia · U.S. Reports ↗Struck the criminal-surety trap three years later.
S2 · Public.Resource.Org · U.S. Reports text ↗Holmes and Lurton dissented.
Links to places on the map where a record shows this rule was applied. It links; it doesn't color the map.
State of Alabama and the power it used. The people on the citizen side are named as the case names them and are not scored.
Montgomery County, Alabama
national — labor-fraud and debt statutes
The dispute began in Montgomery County, Alabama.
The scored institution: State of Alabama.
Links to related places on the map.
On its own, it doesn't change any county's score.
| case_ref | case:bailey-v-alabama |
|---|---|
| Event type | adjudicated_case |
| Location | Montgomery County, Alabama |
| Scale | IV · Institutional · national |
| Direction | +1 · citizen-protective |
| Gravity · Current force | 76 · 70 |
| Method | civic3-gravity-1.0 |
Who won each encounter, from the sources on this page.
| Encounter | What was at stake | Taken by | What changed |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1911-01-03 · Supreme Court of the United States · 219 U.S. 219 (1911) | Did Alabama's labor-contract fraud law, with its presumption and evidence rule, enforce peonage? | CITIZEN | Bailey won, 7–2. S1 ↗ |
Citizen 1 · a count of results, not a score
Gravity, current force and effect use the Civic³ method on the Equation page. Every input below shows its reason and source. Challenge any of them.
The six components below, weighted and summed.
G = .25 Authority + .20 Reach + .20 Durability + .15 Progeny + .10 Cross-domain + .10 Implementation| Input | Score | Weight | Contribution | Reason |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Authority | 90 | 25% | 22.50 | The Supreme Court, 7–2.S1 ↗ |
| Reach | 75 | 20% | 15.00 | Labor-fraud statutes in every state.S1 ↗ |
| Durability | 85 | 20% | 17.00 | Never overruled.S1 ↗ |
| Progeny | 70 | 15% | 10.50 | The anti-evasion principle used against later peonage laws.S1 ↗ |
| Cross-domain | 60 | 10% | 6.00 | Labor, criminal evidence and debt.S1 ↗ |
| Implementation | 45 | 10% | 4.50 | Struck one statute; others were not before the Court.S1 ↗ |
| Total | 100% | 75.50 | Displayed as 76 |
Toward the Thirteenth Amendment; settled.
E = +1 × 76 × 1.0 × 70/100Good law on peonage statutes.
| Field | This file | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Power level /99 | 66 · band 63–69 | From the earlier version (an editorial estimate). |
| Legal / Promise / Divergence | 88 / 54 / 34 | Remedy delivered versus constitutional promise. |
| Battle Power (citizen / institution) | 67 / 43 | Litigation strength of each side, from the five inputs above. |
| Gravity | 76 | All-time constitutional consequence. |
| Current force | 70 | How much of that weight still governs today. |
| Constitutional Effect | +52.8 | Signed present consequence. |
Values from the earlier version.
| Field | Legacy file | This edition |
|---|---|---|
| Power level | 66 · band 63–69 | 66 (carried) |
| Legal / Truth / Divergence | 88 / 54 / 34 | Shown as the Legal and Promise games. |
The legacy page was rebuilt on the case-record chassis from the opinion.
The old page's write-up is carried into the card's full case file. Qualified: 'Alabama simply rewrote its statutes; the practice persisted for decades' and the Booker T. Washington funding are left as open research (not in the opinion read).
What Alabama did after the ruling (the old page said it rewrote its statutes).
The Booker T. Washington funding of the appeal (the old page said so; not checked).
Every number, quote and edge on this page can be challenged with a source.