Taken back to Georgia
In Levy County, Florida, Clyatt and another man seize Gordon and Ridley on Georgia larceny warrants and take them back to work off a debt.S1 ↗
Peonage defined, the federal law upheld, and the conviction reversed on a proof gap.
Samuel Clyatt took two men from Florida back to Georgia on larceny warrants the Court found were likely a pretext, to work off a debt. He was convicted under the federal peonage law and sentenced to four years at hard labor. The Court upheld the law and defined peonage, then reversed: no evidence showed the men had been in peonage before, as a charge of 'returning' them required.
The conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered.S1 ↗Samuel Clyatt said two men, Will Gordon and Mose Ridley, owed him money. In February 1901, in Levy County, Florida, he and another man seized them on Georgia larceny warrants, which the Court found were likely a pretext, and took them back to Georgia to work off the debt. He was indicted under the federal peonage law for returning them to peonage, convicted, and sentenced to four years at hard labor.
The Supreme Court did something that looks like a victory and works like a defeat. Justice Brewer defined peonage as a status or condition of compulsory service based on the peon's debt to the master: the basal fact is indebtedness. The Thirteenth Amendment denounces that status however it is created, so Congress can punish it anywhere, by anyone. Then the Court reversed the conviction. The charge was returning the men to peonage, and there was not a scintilla of testimony that they had been held in peonage before.S1 ↗
The debt was on the record. The forcible return was on the record. The one missing element was a prior condition of peonage, which a charge of 'returning' required. That single word decided the case: a new trial was ordered, the two men received no remedy, and the grand principle floated free of any consequence. Justice Harlan would have let the jury's verdict stand.
The legal score is high because the doctrine is real and durable. The truth score is low because the people at the center of it received nothing.S1 ↗
The federal law reaches individuals in every state.
Debt peonage enforced through state warrants and the power it used. The people on the citizen side are named as the case names them and are not scored.
The definition of peonage, upheld as federal law against anyone, in a case whose own conviction failed.
Clyatt defined peonage; Bailey struck the fraud trap; Reynolds struck the surety trap.
All-time consequence · high. Pointed toward the citizen.
Power level from the earlier version of this page. Band 61–69 · ±4 uncertainty.
citizen-protective · leaningWon the principle; lost the conviction
Conviction reversed
Debt plus compelled labor is peonage. Debt, not the label, makes it peonage. The law reaches individuals, not only states. The charge of 'returning' them failed.S1 ↗
In Levy County, Florida, Clyatt and another man seize Gordon and Ridley on Georgia larceny warrants and take them back to work off a debt.S1 ↗
Charged under the federal peonage law with returning them to peonage.S1 ↗
Sentenced to four years at hard labor.S1 ↗
Brewer for the Court; McKenna concurs in the judgment; Harlan dissents in part.S1 ↗
The opinions and records behind every line on this page.
Brewer, J., for the Court; McKenna concurring in the judgment; Harlan dissenting in part. Decided 13 March 1905. Gordon and Ridley; Levy County, Florida, 11 Feb 1901; four years at hard labor.
Six years later, the fraud-presumption trap struck.
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Each entry opens the court's own words, a plain reading and the limit of the rule.
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Peonage is compulsory service based on debt; Congress may punish it everywhere, against anyone.
It may be defined as a status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master.S1 · Public.Resource.Org · U.S. Reports text ↗
Applied the ban on peonage to a state fraud statute.
S2 · Justia · U.S. Reports ↗Harlan, J., would have let the jury's verdict stand.
Links to places on the map where a record shows this rule was applied. It links; it doesn't color the map.
Debt peonage enforced through state warrants and the power it used. The people on the citizen side are named as the case names them and are not scored.
Florida to Georgia
national — every peonage prosecution
The dispute began in Levy County, Florida.
The scored institution: Debt peonage enforced through state warrants.
Links to related places on the map.
On its own, it doesn't change any county's score.
| case_ref | case:clyatt-v-united-states |
|---|---|
| Event type | adjudicated_case |
| Location | Levy County, Florida |
| Scale | IV · Institutional · national |
| Direction | +1 · citizen-protective |
| Gravity · Current force | 75 · 65 |
| Method | civic3-gravity-1.0 |
Who won each encounter, from the sources on this page.
| Encounter | What was at stake | Taken by | What changed |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1905-03-13 · Supreme Court of the United States · 197 U.S. 207 (1905) | May Congress punish peonage by individuals in every state under the Thirteenth Amendment? | SPLIT | law upheld; conviction reversed. S1 ↗ |
Split 1 · a count of results, not a score
Gravity, current force and effect use the Civic³ method on the Equation page. Every input below shows its reason and source. Challenge any of them.
The six components below, weighted and summed.
G = .25 Authority + .20 Reach + .20 Durability + .15 Progeny + .10 Cross-domain + .10 Implementation| Input | Score | Weight | Contribution | Reason |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Authority | 85 | 25% | 21.25 | The Supreme Court.S1 ↗ |
| Reach | 80 | 20% | 16.00 | Every state; every individual.S1 ↗ |
| Durability | 85 | 20% | 17.00 | The definition still stands.S1 ↗ |
| Progeny | 80 | 15% | 12.00 | The definition of peonage the later cases in this chain apply.S1 ↗ |
| Cross-domain | 60 | 10% | 6.00 | Labor, debt and criminal process.S1 ↗ |
| Implementation | 25 | 10% | 2.50 | No conviction resulted.S1 ↗ |
| Total | 100% | 74.75 | Displayed as 75 |
Toward the Thirteenth Amendment's promise in principle; leaning, because the conviction failed.
E = +1 × 75 × 0.6 × 65/100The definition and the Act's validity stand.
| Field | This file | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Power level /99 | 65 · band 61–69 | From the earlier version (an editorial estimate). |
| Legal / Promise / Divergence | 80 / 38 / 42 | Remedy delivered versus constitutional promise. |
| Battle Power (citizen / institution) | 55 / 48 | Litigation strength of each side, from the five inputs above. |
| Gravity | 75 | All-time constitutional consequence. |
| Current force | 65 | How much of that weight still governs today. |
| Constitutional Effect | +29.2 | Signed present consequence. |
Values from the earlier version.
| Field | Legacy file | This edition |
|---|---|---|
| Power level | 65 · band 61–69 | 65 (carried) |
| Legal / Truth / Divergence | 80 / 38 / 42 | Shown as the Legal and Promise games. |
The legacy page was rebuilt on the case-record chassis from the opinion.
The old page's write-up is carried into the card's full case file. Qualified: 'the first person ever convicted under the Act' and 'the Fifth Circuit certified questions' are not carried (not in the opinion text read). Added the opinion's own words: the warrants were likely a pretext; 'not a scintilla of testimony'.
Whether Clyatt was the first person convicted under the Act (the old page said so).
The outcome of the new trial.
Every number, quote and edge on this page can be challenged with a source.